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NOTE
NATIVE AMERICAN INMATES AND PRISON
GROOMING REGULATIONS: TODAY'S JUSTIFIED
SCALPS: IRON EYES V. HENRY
William Norman*
Introduction
With the rebirth of prisoners' rights over the past twenty-five years,
prison grooming regulations frequently have been challenged in this
nation's courts. Some cases have involved an inmate's right to privacy
or the ability to control his own personal appearance. However, many
adjudications have dealt with a prisoner's religious beliefs, more spe-
cifically the prisoner's constitutional right to exercise freely his religious
beliefs while incarcerated.
Courts generally hold that a prisoner's rights are limited due to the
nature of the penitentiary system as a place of confinement for persons
who are unable to conform to society's laws. I Nevertheless, these same
courts repeatedly confirm the notion that the inmate retains rights
which are not inconsistent with a penitentiary's legitimate objectives
of discipline, safety, security, and the person's status as an inmate.2
Some religions deem grooming issues as a significant part of their
faith. As a result, conflicts often arise between a prisoner's adherence
to these religious practices and prison officials' concerns for discipline
and security. Thus, the courts must determine whether to defer reso-
lution of the conflict to the judgment of prison officials or intervene
on behalf of an inmate.
Many Native American religions perceive a person's hair as a sacred
part of the body. The hair links a person, through strength and
communication, to the Great Spirit; therefore, Native American in-
mates often become the center of controversy in grooming regulation
cases. Compounding the problem, several recent Supreme Court de-
cisions have jeopardized the scope of constitutional rights retained by
inmates. 3 Since the mid- 1980s, district and appellate courts have turned
* Staff attorney, Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Philadelphia, Pa. J.D., 1992,
University of Oklahoma. Recipient, 1992 Salem Civil Rights Award.
1. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
2. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
3. See cases cited supra note 1.
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a deaf ear to complaints by Native American prisoners concerning hair
length regulations. 4 These factors combine to reduce the already limited
religious freedoms of Native American inmates.
This note is divided into five sections. Section I begins with an
overview of cases analyzing freedom of religion, encompassing the
First5 and Fourteenth6 Amendments of the United States Constitution
and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA).7 A discus-
sion of the history and evolution of modern penitentiaries and prison-
ers' rights is presented in section II. Section III introduces the reader
to Native American religious beliefs by discussing the importance of
hair length within these beliefs, and summarizes the court's treatment
of Native American religious beliefs. Next, section IV provides a
summary of prison grooming regulation cases involving Native Amer-
ican inmates. Iron Eyes v. Henry,' an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision that denied a Native American his religious rights, is the most
shocking example of prisoners' rights analysis manipulation. Iron Eyes
is the focus of this note, and will be discussed and analyzed in the
section V.
I. Free Exercise of Religion
The Constitution of the United States of America includes within
its dimensions the protection of certain individual liberties, most of
which are contained in the first ten amendments, known as the Bill
of Rights. 9 Among those amendments lie many fundamental rights
founded in the principles and traditions of the people of this country.
The First Amendment is indeed the epitome of an individual's rights
and it proscribes unwarranted governmental intrusion of these rights.' 0
Stated in full, the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of regulation, or prohibiting
the free exercise therebf; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances.""
In its first two clauses, the First Amendment reflects America's early
effort to protect its citizens from what many immigrants had fled -
religious persecution. The Establishment Clause prohibits government
4. See infra section IV for a summary of recent cases involving Native American
inmates and grooming restrictions.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
8. 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990).
9. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/6
support of religious institutions.12 Generally, where a law has a secular
purpose, a primarily secular effect, and involves no excessive entan-
glement between the government and religion, no Establishment Clause
violation occurs. 3 The second clause, known as the Free-Exercise
Clause, prohibits the government from burdening an individual's free
exercise of religion.'
4
Historically, persons claiming a free-exercise violation had to show
that a substantial burden had been placed on the exercise of his
religion." To overcome such a showing, the government had to artic-
ulate a compelling interest in the regulated activity which justified the
burden. 6 Courts used a strict scrutiny test and balanced the competing
interests of the individual and the government by considering: first,
whether the individual's belief was legitimately religious and sincerely
held; 7 second, whether the regulation coerced the individual to forego
a religious practice derived from this belief;" and third, whether a
compelling government interest existed and whether the least restrictive
means of protecting that interest is used. 19
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,20
the Court severely limited the earlier First Amendment analysis. Smith
involved a denial of unemployment compensation benefits to indivi-
duals who were discharged from their jobs as drug and alcohol reha-
bilitation counselors. The counselors were discharged for ingesting
peyote during a religious ceremony of the Native American Church.
Peyote is a hallucinogenic drug deemed illegal by Oregon state laws
and participation in the peyote ceremony was deemed misconduct;
therefore, the counselors were denied unemployment benefits by Ore-
gon officials. According to Smith, an individual cannot avoid the
requirements of a generally applicable law, even if the law's effect
infringes on the individual's religious practice. 2' The government may
not compel or coerce a person to act in violation of his religious
beliefs; however, the Free-Exercise Clause does not prohibit govern-
mental action which has the "incidental effect" of burdening religious
conduct - no matter how severe the burden. 2
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
the First Amendment's freedom of religion clauses, making the First
12. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
13. Id.; see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 664 (1970).
14. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963).
15. Id. at 406.
16. Id.
17. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
18. Id. at 717-18.
19. Id. at 715-16.
20. 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
21. Id. at 669-72.
22. Id.
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Amendment applicable to the states.2 As a result, persons are now
afforded the opportunity to assert a claim against a state actor or
entity who has deprived them of their constitutional right to exercise
freely their religion.
In Monroe v. Pape,u the Supreme Court held that persons could
obtain relief if they were deprived of their rights by state officers
acting under the color of law, regardless of whether the officer had
actual authority to engage in such activity."Y Congress codified this
ruling in 1964 when it enacted the Federal Civil Rights Act.2 6 The Act
specifically provided redress for persons whose constitutional rights
had been deprived by a state entity. 27 The Monroe holding coupled
with Congress' Act opened the door to an era of civil rights litigation.
In 1978, Congress enacted the AIRFA28 in an effort to preserve the
inherent right of Native Americans to practice their traditional reli-
gions. 29 In 1988, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of Native
Americans' religious freedom when it held in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n30 that the AIRFA had no real significant
effect on the protection of Native American religious rights.3' Thus,
Congress' latest attempt to furnish Native Americans greater protection
has been usurped by the Supreme Court's last word.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The amendment provides in pertinent part: "[Nior
shall any State deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . ." Id.; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 302 (1940) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Free-Exercise Clause); Everson v. Board of
Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947), reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Establishment Clause).
24. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
25. Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia,
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
27. d.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) ("filt shall be the policy of the United States to protect
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express,
and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian . . ").
29. Christopher Vecsey, Prologue, in HANDBOOK OF AmRcICAN INDIAN RELGIOUS
FREEDOM 7, 7 (Christopher Vecsey ed., 1991) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
30. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
31. Id. at 448.
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II. The Evolution of Prisoners' Rights
The general concepts of law set forth in section I provide the
groundwork from which prisoners' rights case law has evolved. Court
decisions within recent years have marked a decrease in the amount
of sensitivity felt towards persons accused or convicted of criminal
conduct. A comparison of historical perspectives on inmates' rights
and recent cases provides a sense of how the law is developing.
As early as 1871, the courts, as well as the general public, viewed
criminals as evil by nature, thus relegating prisoners to the status of
slaves of the state.32 During the early 1800s, criminologists persuaded
society that strict discipline, labor, and the Bible were the proper tools
for rehabilitation of prisoners.33 The penitentiary was established to
isolate the prisoners from society, reversing the bad upbringing or
poor community influence which formed the criminal in the first
place.34 As prison populations increased, prison administrators changed
their focus from rehabilitation to internal security." As a result, today's
prisons are less rehabilitative and more custodial in nature. 6
Although the scope of a prisoner's constitutional rights are limited,
a prisoner does not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of
his incarceration. 7 Throughout the evolution of prisons in America,
the judiciary has shown a reluctance to involve itself in issues pertaining
to prisoners' rights.3 8 First, the courts maintained that management
and control of prisons were executive and legislative functions. 9 Sec-
ond, the courts reasoned where there is state involvement, principles
of federalism require deference to the state(s). 4° Finally, courts perceive
themselves as lacking the skill and training necessary to override the
expertise of prison officials,41 and, as a result, they cast their votes
accordingly. These concepts combine to create a "hands-off" policy
on the part of the judiciary during periods when society as a whole is
unsympathetic towards those who disregard the law.
42
During the 1960s, the civil rights movement, coupled with the Su-
preme Court's sympathy towards the underprivileged, became the back-
drop for the expansion of inmates' rights. 43 Black Muslim prisoners
32. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
33. JAIms T. GOBERT & NEIL P. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PIsoNERs 4 (1981).
34. Id. at 4-5.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-47 (1979).




42. GOBERT & COHEN, supra note 33, at 7-8.
43. Id.
NOTE
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challenged prison regulations, claiming they violated their First Amend-
ment rights. 44 The claims were aimed at establishing that the Black
Muslim faith was a legitimate religion which experienced more severe
restrictions than traditional "Western" religions.41 This barrage of First
Amendment claims by inmates were facilitated by an influx of civil
rights and civil liberties attorneys who forced courts to address claims
on the merits and not simply dismiss the cases as frivolous pro se
complaints. 46
In 1974, the Supreme Court articulated the standard for First
Amendment challenges to prison regulations in Procunier v. Martinez.
47
In determining whether mail censorship regulations were valid, the
Court considered whether the regulation involved a substantial gov-
ernment interest unrelated to the suppression of a First Amendment
right, and whether the regulation was greater than necessary to protect
that interest." In other words, prison regulations burdening the First
Amendment would be upheld to protect a substantial governmental
interest, only if no other less restrictive means to protect that interest
were available.
Recently, the Court partially overruled the Martinez strict-scrutiny
test in favor of a test of reasonableness, which requires the state prison
regulation in question to be reasonably related to penological inter-
ests. 49 Such legitimate regulations include those touching upon the
maintenance and preservation of prison security and discipline. 0 It
seems evident that the Court is regressing from the era of civil rights
decisions in favor of allocating broad discretionary powers to prison
officials.
In Turner v. Safley, s the Court set out the modem standard of
review for prison regulation cases. In Turner, inmates brought a class
action suit against Missouri corrections officials challenging the validity
of the officials' regulations on prison mail and prisoner marriages.
The Turner Court formulated four factors to be used in determining
whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate peno-
logical interests.52 The first factor asks whether there is a valid, rational
connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate govern-
mental interest justifying the regulation. 3 Second, a court must deter-
44. See generally Lee P. Brown, Black Muslim Prisoners and Religious Discrimi-
nation: Tire Developing Criteria for Judicial Review, 32 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 1124
(1964).
45. Id.
46. GO ERT & COHEN, supra note 33, at 8.
47. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
48. Id. at 413.
49. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404 (1989).
50. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
51. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
52. Id. at 90.
53. Id. at 89-90.
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mine whether alternative means exist for the prisoner to exercise his
constitutional right at issue.14 Third, a court must weigh the impact
of accommodating the inmate's right against those of the guards, other
inmates, and prison resources.5 5 The Court emphasized that on this
particular factor, great deference would be given to prison officials.
56
Finally, alternatives that would fully accommodate the inmate's rights
at "de minimis" cost to penological interests should be taken into
account.57 The Court emphasized that this final factor does not require
that the regulation be the least restrictive.5" Justice Stevens, in his
dissenting opinion, argued that the Court's test will permit abuse of
an inmate's rights whenever a warden can come up with a rational
security concern.5 9
One week later, in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,60 the Supreme
Court applied Turner to a situation where a prisoner was forbidden
from leaving a work detail outside the prison walls in order to attend
religious services within the facility. The Court held that the states'
conduct was constitutional. 6' In doing so, the Court reasoned that no
easy alternative to the prison's policy existed. 62 In a strong dissent,
Justice Brennan argued that allowing such deference to prison officials
is wrong.63 Justice Brennan stated that the Constitution was not enacted
to enhance governmental efficiency or reliance on administrative ex-
pertise. 4 Accordingly, Justice Brennan would have adopted the tri-
partite standard applied in Abdul Wali v. Coughlin,65 which required
a court to consider the following three factors when determining the
amount of deference to be given the prison official: (1) the nature of
the right asserted by, the inmate; (2) the activity in which the inmate
seeks to engage; and (3) whether the regulation is a deprivation of a
right rather than a limitation on a right. 6 If the regulated activity is
presumptively dangerous or restricted only in time, place, or manner,
the "reasonable test" of Turner should apply.67 If not "presumptively
54. Id. at 90.
55. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987).
56. Id. at 89.
57. Id. at 90-91.
58. Id. at 90.
59. Id. at 100-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
60. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
61. Id. at 349.
62. Id. at 352-53.
63. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985).
66. Id. at 1030-33.
67. Id. at 1033.
NOTE
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dangerous" or if restricted more broadly than time, place, or manner,
the regulation must be the least restrictive means necessary. 68
Turner remains the standard by which courts judge the constitution-
ality of contested prison regulations. The courts seem willing to broaden
prison authority even further than Turner when members of minority
faiths contest prison regulations that impinge upon their religious
rights.
III. An Introduction to Native American Religious Concepts
An understanding of Native American religious beliefs is as much,
if not more, important than understanding an inmate's First Amend-
ment rights. America's laws and court system have their foundation
in Western Judeo-Christian concepts; therefore, the imposition of
Christian standards and beliefs on Native Americans is inherently
unjust. :Religious practices among the various tribes are diverse, but
the basic beliefs are remarkably similar. 69 One significant difference
between most Native American faiths and Christian beliefs rests in the
knowledge that religion among native peoples cannot be separated or
distinguished from their tradition and culture; nor can their religion
be separated from everyday life. One need only compare this concept
to that of the United States' dedication to the separation of church
and state to see the difference in philosophies.
Native Americans consider nature and all living things interdepen-
dent. The Indians' main role is to be the earth's caretaker and not its
developer. 70 Native Americans believe in sharing whatever wealth one
may have with the less fortunate tribal members. One gains respect
through giving - not through accumulating. An Indian community
views itself as one, not merely as individuals with something in com-
mon. Often, the foundation of a particular tribe's religious beliefs
begins with its respect for and relation tothe tribe's immediate envi-
ronment and natural surroundings. If these resources were to be altered
or destroyed, nature's significance would be trampled, eventually caus-
ing the death of the tradition and culture. Because religion is not just
a "Sunday affair" for traditional Native Americans, the forced alter-
ation of Native American tradition by others creates a serious burden
on their religion.7' The underlying concept that the Creator made each
component of nature in harmony with the other components prevails
68. Id.
69. Se, generally John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution
of Native Americans, 52 MoNm. L. REv. 13 (1991).
70. Id. at 19-21.
71. Id. at 22-24.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/6
No. 1]
among the tribes to this day. In order for the harmony to remain
intact, the Indian must continue in the ways of his ancestors.7 2
The basic belief is that everything the Creator gave the Indian
remains sacred. For example, the body, along with nature and the
earth, denotes spirituality. Hair is considered a gift from the Creator,
and thus, is spiritual; hair embodies the strength needed to endure
difficult times.7 3 If an Indian's hair is removed, his life is drained of
all energy.
Many Indians believe that removal of their hair results in a loss of
communication with the Great Spirit.7 4 The practice among many
Indians is to allow their hair to grow until a loved one is lost, and
then the hair is cut to signify the grief felt by the person mourning
the death. Another traditional practice involves the deceased's family
removing a lock of hair from the dead person soon after death.7 5 The
lock is wrapped in birch bark and, during the following year, cared
for in the same manner as the individual from which it came would
have been.7 6 Food is left for the bundle, new articles of value are
wrapped around the bundle, and the keeper of the bundle watches
over it. The spirit bundle signifies the spirit of the dead relative, and
after a year of mourning, the keeper of the bundle unwraps the articles
from around the lock of hair and presents them to the other relatives
of the deceased's family. . The surviving spouse is often the keeper of
the bundle and receives new clothing and articles following the mourn-
ing period.7 8 Finally, the lock, still wrapped in the birch bark, is buried
beside the grave of the deceased.7 9 Thus, even after death, hair plays
an extraordinary role in the well-being of an individual's spirit.
These religious concepts have no counterpart in Western thought;
therefore, laws derived from Western ideology constitute inherent dis-
crimination by default when applied to traditional beliefs of Native
Americans. Judges, with few exceptions, have yet to grasp the general
concepts of the Indian peoples' beliefs, unless they are able to make
an analogy between the belief at issue and one of Judeo-Christian
importance. For instance, in Reinert v. Haas, ° Native American in-
mates successfully convinced a court that prison regulations violated
their First Amendment rights. The regulation prohibited the wearing
of headbands. The inmates argued that because the headbands signify
72. Id.
73. Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 811 (8th Cir. 1990).
74. Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1523 (10th Cir. 1991).
75. FRANcEs DENSMORE, CHIPPEWA CUSTOMS 38-39, 77-78 (1929).
76. Id. at 78.
77. Id. at 79.
78. Id.
79. DENSMORE, supra note 75; see also RUTH MURRAY UNDERHILL, RED MAN'S
RELIGION, BELmFS, AND PRAcTCics OF m INDLAms NORTH OF MEXICO 79 (1965).
80. 585 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
NOTE
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the sacred circle, the regulation prevented the free exercise of their
religion. The court agreed with the inmates and found that the First
Amendment protects all legitimate religions regardless of origin." Anal-
ogizing headbands to the Christian cross, the court ruled that the
public interest was best served by protecting these inmates' constitu-
tional rights.1
2
In Frank v. Alaska,83 the significance of moose meat was compared
with "the wine and wafer in Christianity." In Frank, an Indian had
been arrested for killing moose out of season. The Indian contended,
however, that the meat was for a funeral ceremony. After analogizing
this with Christian beliefs, the court held the arrest was an abridgement
of the Indian's First Amendment rights.84 However, where no analogy
to Christianity is readily available, Native American beliefs are down-
played as secondary or expendable to the religion as a whole. 8 Where
Native American First Amendment rights are implicated, the courts
have required a direct, severe impediment on the religious practices
before protecting the parties' religious customs.86
When the courts have balanced Indian rights against a state's interest
in regulation, courts have held that tourism, water development, and
commercial development outweigh the Indians' First Amendment
rights.8 Therefore, one cannot be surprised by the near non-existence
of religious rights of Native American inmates. Native religions rarely
receive as much court protection as Judeo-Christian religions, and any
attempt by governmental entities to raise the level of protection for
Native religions is met with the argument that such an effort is an
Establishment Clause violation.88
IV. Historical Summary of Grooming Regulation Cases Involving
Native Americans
Since the early 1970s, several federal cases involving Native American
inmates and prison grooming regulations have surfaced. During the
same period, the Supreme Court has rewritten the law on the consti-
tutional rights of incarcerated persons. As a result of the Supreme
Court developments, analysis by lower courts across the country varies.
The following discussion presents a fairly comprehensive picture of
81. Id. at 478.
82. Id. at 479.
83. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
84. Id. at 1075.
85. See generally Sharon O'Brien, A Legal Analysis of the American Indian Relig-
ious Freedom Act, in HAM~Noox, supra note 29, at 27, 27-43.





cases addressing the conflict between Native American religions and
prison grooming regulations over the past twenty years.
A. Goings v. Aaron
Beginning in 1971, the evidence became clear that courts would
misunderstand an Indian inmate's religious beliefs in the same manner
that courts misunderstood Native American religion and culture in
general. In Goings v. Aaron, 9 a district court in Minnesota rejected
a prisoner's contention that the prison's hair length regulation deprived
him of his constitutional right to exercise his religion.9° Prison officials
granted Goings furlough to attend his father's funeral on the condition
that he obtain a haircut while on leave from the facility. At the
officials' request, Goings had his hair cut before returning. The inmate,
an Oglala Sioux, made a solemn vow on his father's grave to return
to traditional Indian ways, including wearing his hair long in the
traditional Oglala manner.
In the months that followed, his hair grew beyond the length al-
lowed, and officials asked him to cut his hair again. This time Goings
refused, believing that a haircut would break his sacred vow. A broken
vow by Goings would place him in a precarious relationship with the
Great Spirit and jeopardize Goings' reliance on his faith for rehabili-
tation. Prison officials placed him in solitary confinement for diso-
beying their request; he challenged their action in court.
At trial, the court evaluated evidence that Goings could not speak
his native language and had begun only recently to follow his native
religion. The court also heard testimony from experts, explaining that
breaking a vow is a serious infraction against the Creator in the minds
of Native Americans. Other evidence included the separate and distinct
hair regulation for black inmates within the prison. Further, Goings
explained that he lost fifty dollars a month and merits for "good"
time served as a result of his punishment.
Ultimately, the court's decision illustrated the judge's insensitivity
towards Goings' beliefs. The court rejected the argument that the
regulation violated Goings' constitutional rights. 91 Instead, Goings'
beliefs became the focal point of the court's decision. The court held
that the inmate's beliefs were insincere. 92 He had lived nearly twenty-
seven years without following the tenets of his native faith, and could
not become devoutly religious in such a short period of time. 93 Ad-
ditionally, only fifty-five days of his sentence remained, and according
89. 350 F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1972).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 4.
92. Id. at S.
93. Id.
No. 1]
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to the testimony of a Jewish rabbi, Goings could renew his vow when
he was released and suffer no ill-effects. 94 Finally, the court determined
that freedom of religion does not encompass the flagrant disregard of
rules of conduct, either in or out of prison.9s
At the least, the judge's decision is puzzling. The judge chose the
testimony of a rabbi over the testimony of Indian experts who possess
personal knowledge and experience regarding the importance of Goings'
vow. Possibly, the judge did not believe Goings' testimony; however,
one must question any judge's ability to determine the subjective
religious beliefs of a party before him. Even so, the decision goes
beyond Goings' believability. The judge maintained that, even if Goings
was sincere, his constitutional rights were not violated.9 Clearly, this
court would never have considered waiving the regulation for the
inmate during his final fifty-five days in prison. According to Goings,
a reasonable rule of conduct overrides a person's freedom of religion
- whether the person resides in or out of prison.
B. Teterud v. Burns
The next significant case emerging in the area of prisoners' rights
involved a Cree Indian at the Iowa State Penitentiary who challenged
the prisons' hair regulation as a violation of his civil rights. In Teterud
v. Burns,9 prison officials posted a hair-length regulation allowing for
hair growth to the top of the shirt collar in the back, and the bottom
of the ears on the sides. Teterud, a Cree inmate, contacted prison
administrators requesting a religious exemption from the new regula-
tion. The request was denied and, shortly thereafter, Teterud filed
suit.
As articulated by several witnesses at the lower court level, Cree
Indians perceive the Great Spirit as a being with long, natural hair;
therefore, believing they were created in the image of the Great Spirit,
the Crees consider their long hair spiritual in nature. Teterud testified
that if he cut his hair he would die spiritually, while suffering physically
and emotionally. 98
The psychiatrist who routinely recommended treatment for inmates
provided further important testimony. The psychiatrist observed Tet-
erud's passive-aggressive behavior. He concluded that the behavior
resulted from Teterud's clashing feelings of unworthiness as an Indian




97. 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
98. 1.. at 361.
99. Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153, 155 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
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suggested that providing Teterud an exemption under the regulation
would raise the prisoner's self-esteem through instilling pride in his
heritage and religion. 1" In addition to the psychiatrist, a former cor-
rections official agreed that allowing Teterud to grow his hair would
be a determinative factor in his rehabilitation.' 0'
Prison officials argued that Teterud's beliefs were insincere because
he had only recently begun practicing them. However, the district court
was not persuaded by that argument.102 The court pointed out that
Teterud spent much of his life in orphanages and other institutions
not readily open to the practice of traditional Indian customs. 10 3 Next,
the court determined that, although some Native Americans choose
not to wear their hair in the traditional fashion, one should be allowed
to follow the tenets of his religion where the beliefs are in good faith,
and honestly and sincerely held.104
Alternatively, officials at the penitentiary argued that the regulation
was necessary, regardless of whether Teterud's belief was a sincerely
held tenet of his religion. They asserted that long hair creates problems
for sanitary food preparation, safe machine operation, quick inmate
identification, contraband security, and personal hygiene.105 Keeping
in mind the prisoner's rights at all times, the district court refuted
these contentions. The penitentiary could easily curb the problems if
the prison required inmates with long hair to wear hair nets while
performing those duties."'1 Likewise, the penitentiary could rephoto-
graph inmates with long hair to facilitate their quick identification by
officials.1°7 And finally, the assertion that long-haired inmates could
not keep their hair clean was an argument without'substance."'8 The
district court rejected Goings and determined that penal interests could
be obtained by less restrictive means. 1 9
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision." 0 The court stated that a practice deeply rooted in religious
beliefs is sufficiently sincere to invoke free-exercise scrutiny."' Fur-
thermore, the practice need not be an absolute tenet of the religion in
question." 2 The court further noted that, unlike Christian religions,
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 157.
103. Id.
104. Id.




109. Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153, 157 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
110. Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 1975).
111. Id. at 362.
112. Id. at 361.
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followers of Native American religions can participate in other faiths
without contradiction.' The record showed no increased burden on
prison administrators if Teterud's constitutional rights were exer-
cised. 1" Twenty percent of the prison population had not complied
with the regulation, and after five months of noncompliance, no
conflicts resulted." 5 Rights asserted under the First Amendment are
not overcome by justifications founded on fear and apprehension."'
Finding that the hair regulation infringed on Teterud's constitutional
rights, the court struck down the regulation as unconstitutional.1
7
Teterud is important for several reasons. First, the district and
appellate courts analyzed the Native American inmate's religious beliefs
in an unbiased fashion. Any preconceptions about the prisoner's beliefs
were well hidden, and appeared not to influence the decision maker.
A cultural gap is bridged when any one person can completely respect
the "foreign" beliefs of another. This decision was a victory not only
for Native Americans, but for all minority persons whose cultures and
beliefs remain substantially different from those of the majority of the
population.
Second, the author of the appellate opinion here became the lone
dissenter fifteen years later in Iron Eyes v. Henry."" Contrary to
Goings, which held that the hair regulation did not violate the prison-
er's constitutional rights," 9 Teterud demonstrates the importance with
which constitutional rights should be regarded, even where inmates are
involved. In Teterud, the court never lost sight of the positive impact
that Teterud's religion might have on his promise for rehabilitation
and productivity as a citizen.
C. Gallahan v. Hollyfield
In a 1982 decision, the Fourth Circuit reinforced Teterud. Gallahan
v. Hollyfield 20 involved a half-blooded Cherokee prisoner who sub-
scribed to his traditional religion. The inmate's beliefs included the
understanding that hair is a sensory organ similar to a person's eyes
or ears. One's hair symbolizes growth of the being and manifests
living. 'When asked to conform with prison regulations, Gallahan
explained these beliefs to the prison officialt. The State of Virginia
allowed no exemptions to the hair regulation for Native Americans.
Subsequently, Gallahan's hair was forcibly cut twice. Gallahan re-
113. Id.
114. Id. at 360.
115. Id. at 361.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 360.
118. 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990).
119. Goings v. Aaron, 350 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Minn. 1972).
120. 5[6 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Va. 1981), affd, 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/6
sponded by filing suit, alleging that his civil rights had been violated.
Gallahan testified in a deposition under oath about his religion and
the sincerity with which he practiced it.121 In an attempt to refute his
testimony, counsel for the prison officials asked Gallahan to "reveal
the religious name of his God or Supreme Being and [his] Indian
name."'1 The inmate refused to answer. The officials justified their
hair regulation based on the often-asserted fears of difficulty in iden-
tification, easily hidden contraband, and sanitary problems within the
prison.
The trial court held that the officials had not presented enough
evidence to justify limiting the inmate's constitutional rights.'2 There
was no evidence to dispute the fact that Gallahan's beliefs were sincere.
Similarly, officials offered no proof to demonstrate the need for such
regulation.124
After the court denied the prison officials' motion to reconsider,
12
5
the officials appealed. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that the alleged justifications for such a regulation were
either overly broad or lacking in substance.
26
Even if the justification was valid and legitimate, other less restrictive
means remained available to meet administrative objectives. 27 Officials
could require inmates to keep their hair pulled back so that the inmates
would be more identifiable.121 Hair searches would eliminate the pos-
sibility of contraband smuggling. 2 9 Finally, a "neat and clean" groom-
ing requirement would force long-haired inmates to be sanitary. 30
Gallahan is another rare case where a court refused the prison
officials' unjustified limitations on an inmate's constitutional rights.
Even if a person is incarcerated, his First Amendment rights should
not live and die by the breath of a prison official. If such is the case,
then it is a fallacy to say that prisoners retain any constitutional rights
while imprisoned.
D. Weaver v. Jago
In the 1982 case of Weaver v. Jago,'3 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reiterated prison officials' need for more than unsubstantiated
121. Id. at 1007.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1006-07.
124. Id.
125. Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 516 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, 670
F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982).
126. Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670 F.2d 1345, 1346 (4th Cir. 1982).
127. Id. at 1346-47.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1347.
131. 675 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1982).
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justifications, especially if the penitentiary expected regulations limiting
constitutional rights to be upheld. 132 At the lower court level, the
prison administrators' affidavit in support of their motion for summary
judgment alleged that a hair regulation furthered the security, health,
and safety of all persons within the prison.3 The prison had subjected
an inmate to several disciplinary actions for refusing to cut his hair.
The prisoner, Don Weaver, continued to ignore the regulation be-
cause, as a Cherokee, he believed short hair was contrary to the image
of the Great Spirit. Weaver believed haircutting signified disgrace and
humiliation - a state of mourning. Thus, he challenged the regulation
as a violation of his civil rights. According to the Sixth Circuit's
opinion, the district court granted the penitentiary's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the court would not substitute its
judgment for that of the prison officials. 34 Based on Weaver's appeal
from summary judgment, the case made its way to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the hair
regulation implicated the prisoner's First Amendment rights. 3 There-
fore, the lower court should have considered and balanced the inmate's
rights along with the interests of the officials. 36 The court held on
remand that officials must do more than just offer conclusory state-
ments that a regulation is necessary before the court will allow a
limitation on religious freedom.
3 7
Weaver, however, would be the last refreshing piece of judicial
analysis involving Native Americans and prison grooming regulations
for quite some time. Over the next nine years, courts allowed prison
officials to dictate the scope of Native American prisoners' religious
rights.
E. Griffin v. Duggar
Griffin v. Duggar38 involved a member of the Blackfoot Nation
who brought a civil rights action seeking an injunction to prevent
prison officials from cutting his hair. The inmate testified that when
132. Id. at 119.
133. I. at 118.
134. Id. at 117.
135. Id. at 118.
136. Id. at 119.
137. Id.
138. Case No. 79-758-Civ-J-B (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 1984). The magistrate report and
recommendation in Griffin, entered July 14, 1983, is reproduced as appendix I in
Shabazz v. Burnauskas, 600 F. Supp. 712, 716-29 (M.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d
1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1011 (1986). The district court's order in Griffin
is reproduced as appendix 2 in Shabazz, 600 F. Supp. at 729-31.
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his hair was cut, he felt his soul had been shaved. 3 9 Earlier in his life,
the prisoner chose not to enlist in the Armed Forces because the
military required haircuts.
Other Indian inmates testified about the religious connotations of a
haircut. Their testimony indicated that to cut an inmates' hair would
be like cutting an Indian's fleshY"' Hair is natural and places a person
in harmony with the earth. Unless an Indian lives his religion, he has
none. When asked where long hair ranked among the tenets of the
religion, one inmate responded that each tenet of an inmate's religion
ranks equally in importance with another; the presence of one tenet
does not make up for the lack of another.
1 41
The prisoner argued that cutting an Indian's hair was similar to
taking the Bible away from a Christian. Moreover, the prison allowed
death row inmates to wear beards and long hair, and allowed members
of other religions to wear symbols of their respective religions such as
the Christian Cross or the Jewish Star of David.
142
Prison officials attacked the inmate's sincerity. The prisoner also
had a Catholic background and had attended services of other religions;
therefore, prison officials asserted that he could not simultaneously
practice his people's traditional religion. They proffered a prison chap-
lain with no understanding of Native American religions who testified
that the inmate's traditional religion was incompatible with Catholi-
cism. 1
43
Officials also contended that the regulation was necessary, whether
or not the inmate's beliefs were sincere. The officials argued that the
restriction furthered identification of inmates and promoted discipline
through conformity. Health and sanitary conditions were emphasized
as additional reasons for the requirement. The officials argued that
rephotographing inmates was not a feasible alternative to the regulation
because of the time and money required.
The magistrate court determined that the inmate's beliefs in Native
American religion were sincere, despite his Catholic upbringing.
144
However, the court also said that it must give prison officials great
deference with policies impacting on the administration of penal insti-
tutionsY.5 The court balanced the prison's interest in discipline, health,
sanitation, and security against the possibility of accommodating the
139. Shabazz, 600 F. Supp. at 718 (reproducing magistrate report and recommen-
dation in Griffin).
140. Id. at 716.
141. Id. at 717.
142. Id. at 716-17.
143. Id. at 719-20.
144. Id. at 728.
145. Id. at 727.
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inmate by rephotographing him instead of cutting his hair. 46 The
magistrate held that the penitentiary's justifications were reasonable.4 7
The district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, reasoning that,
no matter what balancing tests were employed, no less restrictive means
were available. '4
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
Griffin holding that a hair regulation was the least restrictive means
of protecting penitentiary interests; therefore, it outweighed a prison-
er's First Amendment rights. 4 9 Griffin foreshadowed the future for
Native American prisoners. The Griffin court disregarded the less
restrictive means of rephotographing inmates. Instead, the Griffin court
deemed a prison official's opinion, supported by unsubstantiated jus-
tifications, more important than a prisoner's religious rights.
F. Capoeman v. Reed
Capoeman v. Reed50 involved a Native American confined for a
period of time in a Washington State penitentiary. Prison officials
ordered the inmate to cut his hair so they could take "before and
after" photographs for identification purposes. The prisoner objected
on religious grounds, and offered instead to pull his hair back. Ca-
poeman continued resisting for a week, and even requested disciplinary
segregation until the matter could be resolved.
Shortly thereafter, Capoeman was taken from his cell and the of-
ficials forcibly cut his hair. Fourteen months later, the prison imple-
mented an exemption for the grooming regulation for Native Americans.
The court subsequently overturned the inmate's conviction and he was
released. However, Capoeman filed a civil rights action against prison
officials for the haircutting incident.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's
conclusion that, although the incident appeared to be a serious con-
stitutional violation, under current law state officials were immune
from damages."' The court found that officials could not be sued
because their conduct did not violate "clearly established" constitu-
tional rights which a reasonable person would have known.3 2 Although
there were no controlling cases in the Ninth Circuit at the time, the
weight of relevant cases in other circuits were in Capoeman's favor.
However, the Ninth Circuit refused to charge the officials with know-
ledge that their conduct violated clearly established law.
146. See id. at 728-29.
147. Id. at 729.
148. Id. at 730 (reproducing district court's order in Griffin).
149. 790 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1986).
150. 754 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1985).
151. Id. at 1515-16.
152. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss1/6
Surely the prison officials had knowledge of the prisoner's religious
rights, especially given the fact that this was not a case or situation
of first impression within the prison context. Prison administration is
a job which requires knowledge of prisoner's rights. Maybe Capoe-
man's prison administrators did not consider Capoeman's beliefs sin-
cere, or maybe they considered the prison's interests to be more
important. Nevertheless, prison officials knew (or should have known)
that an inmate's constitutional rights were implicated although they
chose to disregard them. This type of state action should never be
protected from redress.
G. Cole v. Flick
In Cole v. Flick,"' a half-blood Cherokee, Cole, was ordered to
have his hair cut to conform with prison regulations. Cole refused on
religious grounds. As a result, officials filed a misconduct report.
Officials then provided Cole with a hearing in front of a committee
so that he could explain his refusal and the beliefs. Ultimately, the
committee found Cole guilty of refusing to obey an order and sentenced
him to thirty days of disciplinary confinement. To escape further
punishment, Cole allowed prison officials to cut his hair. Cole then
filed suit against the prison, challenging its regulation.
Prison officials listed five main reasons for the hair regulation. First,
the regulation promoted identification throughout the prison. Second,
short hair prevented the concealment of contraband. Third, short hair
reduced an inmate's attractiveness to predatory homosexuals, and
generally reduced the incidents of homosexuality. Fourth, long hair
created safety problems for inmates working with machinery and
sanitation problems for those in food service. Hats and hair nets did
not adequately cure these problems. Fifth, if officials permitted long
hair, inmates would lose respect for prison rules and the authorities
that enforce them. Further, inmates would become jealous of one
another.
The district court rejected the reasoning of the officials and enjoined
the prison from continued enforcement of the regulation against the
inmate.5 4 As to the officials' first justification for the regulation, the
court pointed out that the prison ran photographic identification op-
erations haphazardly.'55 Thus, cutting the inmate's hair in violation of
his rights for identification purposes was pretextual. Next, strip searches
were already routine for inmates in contact with visitors, and these
searches included hair inspections; therefore, any heightened risk of
concealed contraband was minimal.'56 Third, the officials presented no
153. 758 F.2d 124 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921 (1985).
154. Id. at 124.
155. Id. at 126.
156. Id. at 127.
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evidence that long hair would create problems with predatory homo-
sexuals or encourage homosexuality.'5 7 The court further refused to
believe that hats and hair nets would not adequately solve problems
with machinery and food.' 8 Finally, the court found the officials'
argument that inmates would become disrespectful towards guards and
prison regulations unreasonable, in light of the fact that some groups,
such as the Muslim prisoners, were currently receiving different treat-
ment without such a result. 59
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had its own ideas
concerning the validity of such regulations against Native American
prisoners. The Third Circuit held that the district court erred by not
relying On the testimony of four expert witnesses.16' The experts, who
were all wardens, testified that the regulation was necessary for the
same reasons asserted by prison officials.' 6' The court distinguished
Cole from Gallahan and Teterud because neither one involved the
"predatory homosexuality" justification that was asserted in Cole.162
Similarly, both cases required a "least restrictive means" test which
was not followed by the Third Circuit. 63
The test in Cole required a Native American prisoner to show by
substantial evidence that the prison officials' reasons for the regulation
were unreasonable or exaggerated. 1' This created a much higher burden
for Cole than the "least restrictive means" test would have required.
The officials' beliefs concerning the need for regulation were "sincere"
and "arguably correct"; therefore, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's decision and entered judgment for the
officials. 16
The Cole decision was more than a shocking setback for Native
American prisoners. When the Supreme Court refused to review the
case, ' the Court sent a signal to all prison administrators that religious
rights of inmates could be restricted with little more than imaginative
justifications.
H. Pollock v. Marshall
The next significant case, Pollock v. Marshall,67 involved a Native
American who adhered to the Lakota religion. The inmate sought an
157. I.
158. I.
159. I. at 127-28.
160. Id. at 128-29.
161. Id. at 129.
162. Id. at 131 n.9 (citing Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670 F.2d 1345, 1346-47 (4th Cir.
1982); Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357, 362 (8th Cir. 1975)).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 131-32.
165. Il at 132.
166. 474 U.S. 921 (1985).
167. 656 F. Supp. 957 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 987 (1988).
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injunction that would prohibit prison officials from cutting his hair.
The prisoner contended that he was entitled to keep his hair long,
pursuant to a section of the Ohio Administrative Code.11 The code
allowed prison officials to modify hair length regulations upon an
inmate's showing a sincerely held belief that was rooted in religion
and that conflicted with the restriction.16 9
Prison officials made two motions for summary judgment, and listed
fourteen justifications for regulating hair length within the prison
environment. Among those justifications were quick identification of
inmates within the prison or after escape, reduction in the ability of
inmates to smuggle contraband, reduced tension among inmates and
guards by reduction in contact between them, reduced homosexual
attacks and activity, machine safety, and sanitation concerns. The
inmate argued that the sincerity of his beliefs remained in controversy
and was an issue of material fact; therefore, motion for summary
judgment was not proper.
The district court granted the prison's motion for summary judg-
ment.'70 The officials had not disputed the sincerity of the inmate's
beliefs; therefore, sincerity was not at issue.171 Second, the inmate's
sincerity was not the sole determinative issue because sincerity does
not automatically render the regulation unconstitutional.172 Officials
made reasonable and substantial justifications for the limitation which
the court determined would have passed a higher standard of scrutiny
than required.173 The court refused to second guess officials on matters
concerning prison security, even where the regulation affected consti-
tutional rights in a "discomforting" manner.1 74 Prison officials needed
to show only that a "potential danger" existed. 75 Finally, if the inmate
was permitted to wear his hair long, the prison would be drawing
distinctions between prisoners, instead of viewing all inmates from a
neutral, objective standard.
7 6
Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case under Turner v.
Safley, 77 which had recently been decided by the Supreme Court.
Relying on the factors used in Turner to determine whether a prison
168. Omo ADrm. CODE § 5120-9-25(F) (1983), noted in Pollock, 656 F..Supp. at
958. The language discussed by the court was deleted by amendment effective Aug. 26,
1991.
169. Id.
170. Pollock, 656 F. Supp. at 963.
171. Id. at 959.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 962-63.
174. Id. at 961.
175. Id. at 163.
176. Id. at 962.
177. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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regulation is valid, the Sixth Circuit blindly accepted the prison offi-
cials' justifications for the regulation.' The inmate had not refuted
each and every reason for the regulation; therefore, the officials'
motion for summary judgment was affirmed. 7 9
In Pollock, the courts refused to accept their responsibility to uphold
the Constitution. They shrugged off the penitentiary's action as if no
First Amendment rights had been implicated. The courts forced the
inmate to prove that his case would be wholly successful on the merits
before the courts would allow the prisoner any opportunity to address
the merits of the case. Evidenced by the "Court of last resort's" denial
of certiorari, either the inmate in Pollock suffered no violation of his
rights, or the Supreme Court refused to accept its responsibility to
uphold a prisoner's limited rights under the Constitution.
V. Discussion and Analysis of Iron Eyes v. Henry
A. Iron Eyes v. Henry
Robert Iron Eyes, an enrolled member of the Standing Rock Sioux,
was born on the Standing Rock Reservation in North Dakota. As a
Native American born and raised in the traditions of the Sioux, he
practices the pipe religion. Following the custom of his peoples' rich
culture, Iron Eyes wears his hair naturally and refrains from cutting
it, except as a symbol of grief for the loss of a loved one. According
to his heritage and religion, the cutting of his hair offends the Great
Spirit, unless done so in mourning because hair is a gift from the
Creator. In twenty-seven years, his hair was cut just five times; three
of those, times he was in mourning. Twice, however, corrections of-
ficials at the Farmington Correctional Center in Farmington, Missouri,
forcibly cut Iron Eyes' hair.
At the beginning of his incarceration, which began in October
1987,180 the Farmington corrections supervisor directed Iron Eyes to
cut his hair in compliance with prison grooming regulations. Iron Eyes
informed the official of his Native American heritage and religious
beliefs against interference with hair growth. The supervisor allegedly
reviewed Iron Eyes' file for proof of his Native American heritage,
but found no information that was indicative of "Indianness."'' 1
178. Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 987 (1988).
179. 1d. at 659-60.
180. Iron Eyes was imprisoned from July 1986 to July 1987 at another facility. No
attempt was made to cut his hair at that time. See Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810,
812 n.4 (8th Cir. 1990).
181. This fact was disputed at the district court level by the testimony of a prison
barber. The barber described that, at the time of the first haircut, prison officials
possessed proof of Iron Eyes' Native American heritage. See id. at 818 n.6.
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In December 1987, the issue arose again. Prison officials ordered
Iron Eyes to either conform to prison grooming standards or be
segregated from the general prison population. Iron Eyes refused on
the basis of his religious tenets. As a consequence, he was placed in
isolation. Four days later, officials handcuffed and shackled the inmate
while a prison barber forcibly cut his hair. As a result, Iron Eyes filed
a pro se complaint under the Civil Rights Act.
182
The following September, officials again ordered Iron Eyes to cut
his hair. Iron Eyes obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting
the cutting of his hair. Nonetheless, he was disciplined by prison
officials for disobeying their order. In October, Iron Eyes amended
his complaint and requested injunctive relief, as well as damages for
the previous incident. The court granted him a preliminary injunction,
and recommended that he seek an exemption to the grooming regu-
lation through the prison officials."'
Iron Eyes submitted proof of enrollment in his tribe to the super-
intendent at Farmington, who forwarded the information with Iron
Eyes' request for exemption to the zone director of adult institutions
in Missouri. The regulation required that hair be no longer than the
base of an inmate's shirt collar. IM However, pursuant to a court order
or decision by the zone director, Native Americans were permitted to
grow their hair beyond such length." 5 The zone director denied Iron
Eyes' request without explanation. Subsequently, Iron Eyes was cited
for failure to cut his hair. Prison officials had interpreted the inmate's
preliminary injunction as merely prohibiting them from forcibly cutting
it.
According to the Eighth Circuit, after a bench trial regarding the
merits of the complaint, the district court ruled in favor of Farmington
administrators. 8 6 While a corresponding request for a temporary re-
straining order awaited determination at the appellate level, prison
administrators presented Iron Eyes with the choice again of cutting
his hair or being segregated in disciplinary isolation. Iron Eyes allowed
them to cut his hair and avoided disciplinary isolation. After the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals took the case under submission,
1 7
Missouri's Department of Corrections and Human Resources removed
the exemption possibility for inmates.188
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
183. Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 812 n.24.
184. Div. Rule 116.050(3), Mo. ADMN. CODE tit. 14, div. 20, ch. 16, quoted in
Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 811 n.3.
185. Id.
186. Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 811. Because Iron Eyes had been released from prison
during the pendency of the appeal, the issue of injunctive relief was no longer relevant.
Id. at 812 n.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 818 n.8.
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The appellate court began its review by stating that courts of law
are pa.,rticularly ill-equipped to second guess prison officials and ad-
ministrators in areas where the court's lack of expertise may result in
incompetency.8 9 The court suggested, nonetheless, that inmates retain
some constitutional rights, including the right to exercise freely one's
religion under the First Amendment.' 9°
Next, the court rejected Iron Eyes' reliance on Teterud as relevant
precedent.' 9' Although the Teterud case involved a Native American
inmate's noncompliance with grooming regulations and the decision
was favorable for inmates, more recent inmate cases in the Eighth
Circuit and the Supreme Court limited Teterud severely.'9 The deter-
minative factor was no longer whether legitimate penological interests
could be served by less restrictive means, but instead, whether the
prison regulation was reasonably related to legitimate penological in-
terests.' 93
Next, the court examined the Farmington officials' contention that
Iron Eyes' beliefs were not sincerely held and that the beliefs were not
an essential tenet of his religion. The appellate court examined the
district court's finding that Iron Eyes genuinely possessed his beliefs,
as illustrated by continued adherence to the beliefs and practices
throughout his life, but the court refused to conclude that the district
court's holding was clearly erroneous.'9
The court then analyzed the prison restrictions under the four factors
set forth by the Supreme Court in Turner. The first component requires
a neutral and legitimate objective behind the regulation at issue, and
a rational relationship between the objective and the regulation. Prison
officials maintained that the restriction facilitated identification of
inmates and prevented concealment of contraband in lengthy hair.
Both factors underlying the objective of the regulation involved security
affairs within the prison walls; therefore, the courts deemed the reg-
ulation legitimate. 95
The court found the regulation was nondiscriminatory and neutral
in nature because the regulation included an "exception to the regu-
lation" for Native Americans. 96 Although the prison denied Iron Eyes
the right to fall within the exception, the court refused to consider the
denial and focused on the presence of an exemption policy.'97 Iron
189. Id. at 812.
190. rd.
191. Id. at 813 (noting Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 814.





Eyes also contended there was no logical connection between the
objectives and the restriction because numerous options remained for
inmates wishing to smuggle contraband. The court, however, was
unpersuaded that the availability of other options for smuggling con-
traband reduced the connection between the officials' objectives and
the hair regulation. 19
Additionally, Iron Eyes argued that Farmington's identification con-
cerns were pretextual in nature. The officials forcibly cut his hair twice
but never photographed him with short hair. Furthermore, an extra
photograph of an inmate with his hair pulled back alleviates the
possibility that upon escape the inmate could quickly shear his hair
and become instantly unidentifiable to law enforcement officials. Nev-
ertheless, the court noted that long hair and possible quick alteration
of appearance "could conceivably" hinder the identification of an
inmate. 99 Thus, Farmington's hair restriction passed the legitimate and
neutral standard. The court deemed that the regulation was rationally
related to security concerns, which satisfied the first prong of Turner.2°°
The second Turner factor involves the question of whether alternative
means of exercising the restricted right remain available for the inmate.
The majority rejected Iron Eyes' contention that the right at issue was
his religious need to grow his hair. Instead, the court examined Iron
Eyes' right broadly, stating the issue as whether Iron Eyes could freely
practice his religion.20'
Farmington restricted hair growth and prohibited the ghost dance
and sweat lodge ceremonies, which were necessary tenets of Iron Eyes'
religion. Officials did allow the pipe ceremony and'sun dance, so Iron
Eyes was not totally foreclosed from practicing his religion. 20 2 The
restrictions were considered to be a result of Iron Eyes' breaking the
law. These restrictions were brought on by Iron Eyes and the restric-
tions were not so wide-ranging as to completely prohibit the exercise
of his rights. 203
Next, the court turned to Turner's third factor concerning the impact
that accommodating Iron Eyes would have on prison guards, fellow
inmates, and prison resources. Farmington set forth several reasons
why accommodation for inmates was inappropriate. Searches of long-
haired inmates would take longer and be required more often as a
result of the hair length. The attention that would have to be focused
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while overextending already limited resources. Likewise, granting an
exemption to Iron Eyes would create the appearance that prison of-
ficials were granting special privileges to him and others similarly
situated; this would generate jealousy among the prisoners. The court
deferred its own judgment to the prison officials' judgment and ac-
cepted Farmington's arguments.20
Under the third prong of Turner, the court ascertained whether any
alternatives to the regulation existed that would fully accommodate
the Indian prisoner's religious beliefs at little cost to the prison's
objectives. The court focused its analysis on the fact that an exemption
existed for Native Americans. 20- Iron Eyes and all other Native Amer-
icans who sought the exemption had been unsuccessful in their attempts
at securing permission to grow their hair. Not only were the prison
officials the ones who made the rules, but also, ironically, they were
the proper authorities for determining when an exemption could be
granted.305
It is interesting to note that the process for obtaining an exemption
to Farmington's regulation was removed before the court of appeals
heard the case. The court acknowledged the extraction of the exemption
process from the regulation, yet had the audacity to hold that the
existence of an exemption policy was the only viable way of accom-
modating Native American inmates . 3 7 It is paradoxical that the court
determined that the prison officials had accommodated Iron Eyes'
religious beliefs because of the existence of an exemption to the
regulation; in fact, the court knew the exemption was no longer in
existence. Nonetheless, the court explained that anything more would
result in more than a "de minimis" cost to the prison's valid inter-
ests."' Thus, the hair restriction passed Turner's final factor. 209
In conclusion, the court admonished the Farmington officials for
requiring Iron Eyes to submit proof of his obvious Native American
heritage. 210 The court of appeals also stated that, under certain circum-
stances, the court might have sanctioned the officials for cutting Iron
Eyes' hair while he awaited the court's determination of his motion
for a temporary injunction .21 Nevertheless, the court held in favor of
the officials, and found Iron Eyes' right to exercise his religion was
outweighed by penological interests. 212
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Senior Circuit Judge Heaney, author of the Teterud decision, fied
a lengthy dissent. 213 Judge Heaney analyzed the facts under the Turner
criteria, but emphasized that the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Thornburgh v. Abbott214 required the standard of review to be more
than a "toothless" inquiry into the prison policy.25 Judge Heaney
also noted a recent Eighth Circuit decision which held that a court
should only defer to prison officials' judgment concerning reasonable
policies, and not the prison's justifications for the policies.2 6 Next,
Judge Heaney noted that Turner did not require courts to uphold
restrictions that were broader than necessary nor did it require policy
alternatives to be entirely cost-free.
217
Under the first Turner factor, Judge Heaney insisted that the expla-
nations set forth by prison officials in 1990 mirrored the justifications
that were deemed pretextual in Teterud; Teterud rejected identification
and contraband smuggling as valid justifications. 2 8 In Teterud, a large
portion of inmates were in noncompliance with the hair regulation,
but they were not involved in any misconduct as a result of their
noncompliance.
219
Judge Heaney also took issue with the Missouri officials' failure to
present sufficient evidence to support their arguments. 220 These officials
presented no evidence of identification difficulties, even though the
prison's enforcement of the grooming code had been much less than
strict. 22' Secondly, officials admitted that the prison had never discov-
ered contraband in long hair, despite the careless way in which the
regulation was enforced. Thus, the officials' statements that long hair
caused identification problems and promoted the smuggling of contra-
band were not supported by the evidence.t22
The dissent rebutted the identification justification even further.
Only a handful of Native Americans resided at the Farmington Cor-
rectional Facility, although the prison population was 1700. Inmates
exempted from the hair regulation would have been instantly identi-
fiable due to the distinguishing feature of long hair.m Iron Eyes was
distinctively Native American in appearance, which further facilitated
his identification? 4 Finally, if long hair caused such a difficult iden-
213. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
214. 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
215. Iron Eyes, 907 F.2d at 819 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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tification problem, why did officials choose not to rephotograph him,
since Iron Eyes' prison admission photo showed him with long hair?
The dissent argued that the idea that short hair facilitates easy iden-
tification was pretextual in nature.25 Likewise, where the facility pro-
duced no evidence that long hair.caused security problems, a regulation
requiring short hair in order to reduce security problems was over-
broad. 225
Astoundingly, rephotographing four inmates out of 1700 required
no more than "de minimis" cost to prison officials.? 7 Moreover,
officials searched prisoners on a regular basis regardless of the length
of their hair. The additional time required for guards to check on
inmates lengthy hair would have been, at most, ten seconds.28 The
prison allowed long hair before, and presented no evidence that inmates
resented the additional search time, or that it caused confrontations
between guards and inmates?29 Accommodation (differential treatment
based on an inmate's beliefs) does not become unreasonable merely
because a potential for misbehavior might exist;2 0 therefore, the impact
from the officials' accommodation of Iron Eyes would have been
minimal.
The dissent urged that the argument that special privileges bestowed
upon certain inmates would create jealousy among all inmates was
overbroad.231 Such an argument, if true, would eliminate the ability
of officials to treat any inmate different than another because jealousies
might arise. If inmates were treated exactly the same, no inmates could
retain any religious freedom inconsistent with the treatment of all
inmates. Moreover, treating all inmates in the same manner conflicted
with Turner's fourth factor, which requires courts to consider the
available alternatives to accommodating prisoners.232 The regulations
would disproportionately impact on minority religions, whose practices
were unfamiliar to most. Finally, when prison officials rewarded in-
mates for "good behavior," they would be generating inmate jealousy.
There is no reason why constitutional rights should be any different
from the good behavior perks, which reap the benefits of differential
treatment, despite jealousy among inmates.2 33
Judge Heaney's last attack on justifications set forth by the Farm-
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ington officials related to colleagues' policies within the Eighth Circuit;
Missouri was the only jurisdiction within that circuit which regulated
hair length. 234 Other jurisdictions either had no hair length limit or
accommodated prisoners by rephotographing those with long hair. 31
According to Judge Heaney, such evidence was persuasive in showing
that officials had exaggerated their predicament.
36
Finally, Judge Heaney disagreed with the majority's disposal of the
case as a facially valid and reasonable hair length regulation containing
a religious exemption. 237 Heaney pointed out that the court relied on
the existence of an exemption when they deemed the regulation neu-
tral. 238 Likewise, the majority asserted that the availability of the
exemption was the only viable alternative under the fourth factor of
Turner.23 9 However, the State discarded the exemption before the court
heard the case. 240 Iron Eyes' complaint not only challenged the validity
of the regulation, but the way in which the regulation was applied.
The court ignored this, and based its decision on the facial validity of
the regulation containing an exemption, thus, refusing to remand the
case to the district court for a determination of how the officials
enforced (applied) the regulation against Iron Eyes personally. 24'
B. Analysis of Iron Eyes v. Henry
The majority not only erred in their judgment, they perverted their
analysis to the point that questions concerning this decision must be
raised. The prison officials' justifications might well have passed a test
of strict scrutiny in the presence of the court of appeals. Although
inquiry into the motivations behind the judgment would only be
speculative, the court's analysis speaks for itself.
First of all, the majority relied heavily on a fact they knew no
longer existed. They deemed the grooming regulation neutral and
nondiscriminatory, due solely to the fact that an exemption existed.
No exemption existed at the time of the decision. Indeed, no Native
American prisoner had ever been successful in obtaining such an
exemption. This lends credence to the fact that the exemption's "for-
mal" existence was pretextual.
The court agreed with officials who justified the refusal of Iron
Eyes' request by asserting that other inmates would become jealous. 2-
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ferently from each other for several reasons, including religion. In
addition, the court was required under Turner v. Safley24 to consider
whether accommodation was viable. The court ignored the fact that
prisoners cannot retain most constitutional rights if the system treats
them exactly alike.
The court relied again on the existence of a regulatory exemption
for religious beliefs when the court determined that any other viable
alternative for Iron Eyes would cause more than "de minimis" costs
to the penitentiary.2" The exemption did not exist; therefore, there
was no other "easy" means of respecting Iron Eyes' rights. 24
Throughout the proceedings, prison officials at Farmington stressed
the importance of the regulation for the purpose of rapid inmate
identification. The court knew the prison's photograph procedures
were haphazard. The court knew that the officials had not photo-
graphed. Iron Eyes with short hair after they had forcibly cut his hair.
The court held that the regulation outweighed Iron Eyes' religious
rights because long hair "could conceivably" hinder the identification
of inmates.246
Although the court found in favor of prison officials, the officials
presented no evidence tending to legitimize the hair regulation. As'
noted above, officials were not too concerned with identification prob-
lems as demonstrated by their own inaction. In addition, the officials
presented no evidence showing their alleged identification difficulties.
The prison admitted that they had never seized contraband from the
long hadr of an inmate. There was no evidence that searches of
prisoners with long hair produced conflicts between the prisoners and
the guards. Yet, the court chose to imagine the presence of evidence
justifying the regulations.
Some of the blame for the court's discouraging decision belongs to
the Supreme Court. The Turner decision significantly lowered the
hurdle that prison officials must jump when restricting constitutional
rights. Interpreted as broadly as the analysis in Iron Eyes, Turner
could facilitate the abolishment of all prisoners' rights.
As a short analogy, a restriction against the possession of a Bible
within prison walls could be construed as rationally related to legitimate
penological interests. An opinion from the court that decided Iron
Eyes might look something like the following: Although possession of
the Bible inside prison walls is prohibited, such a regulation is consti-
tutional. Pages of the Bible "could conceivably" be crumpled up and
swallowed, endangering the lives of inmates. Paper cuts might become
243. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
244. Ion Eyes, 907 F.2d at 816 (Heaney, J. dissenting).
245. 1d.
246. Id. at 814.
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rampant. Contraband could be smuggled or weapons hidden between
pages. Bible-carriers are subject to random homosexual assaults be-
cause they are perceived as too sensitive or feminine. These problems
raise security concerns. Prisoners could continue to pray in secret;
therefore, Christians are not completely foreclosed from practicing
their religion. Additionally, the exemption to the Bible prohibition that
once existed for true Christians is the only viable means of accom-
modating the prisoners. (Although the exemption no longer exists, and
although no inmates ever successfully obtained exemption status, this
analogy will only consider the Bible restriction with the Christian
exemption.) Allowing certain prisoners the privilege of possessing a
Bible might create hostility among members of minority faiths unable
to maintain "mementos" of their religion. An inmate's possession of
a Bible for any length of time creates many problems and no "easy"
alternative exists for accommodating the prisoners that would be at
"de minimis" cost to the penitentiary.
The reasoning in this analogy may seem ridiculous at first glance.
If it does, one should review the holdings in Iron Eyes. Of course,
the courts would never allow such Bible restrictions to occur, and for
good reason. Narrow-mindedness, stereotypical viewpoints, and an
inherent misunderstanding of Native American religions are the only
reasons for courts to view the two situations differently. One must
ask whether judges with such a limited capacity in acknowledging the
differences among cultures should be permitted to determine the rights
of persons unlike themselves.
Since Iron Eyes, four more cases have found their way to courts
because grooming regulations limit the rights of Native American
inmates. Although the cases are not as discouraging as Iron Eyes, each
one is important in its own right and will be summarized here.
C. Escalanti v. Lewis
In a recent, unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused in Escalanti v. Lewis247 to apply the AIRFA2 to the Arizona
Department of Corrections. 249 The Native American inmate argued that
the prison's grooming regulations were a violation of AIRFA. The
court reasoned that because the prison was not a federal agency, the
prison officials were not obligated under the statute in any wayY 0
Even if AIRFA did apply, the inmate would have no real cause of
action as a result of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
247. No. 89-16598, 1991 WL 83900 (9th Cir. May 22, 1991). This unpublished
disposition was listed in a table at 933 F.2d 1013.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
249. Escalanti, No. 89-16598, 1991 WL 83900, at *1.
250. Id.
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Ass'n,211 which held that AIRFA is only a general policy statement. 252
The court's analysis was deemed complete because Arizona's interests
in prisoner identification were reasonably related to the regulation and
the prisoner suggested no alternatives.2Y3
D. Hall v. Bellmon
In Hall v. Bellmon,254 the Lexington Assessment and Reception
Center (LARC) required all new inmates to have their hair cut upon
arrival. Officials urged that the policy prevented the inmates from
hiding weapons and easily changing their appearance upon escape, and
it also facilitated good hygiene. LARC had not enacted an exemption
policy for religious beliefs because the center is a holding facility. The
average stay for inmates was allegedly only ten days.
The inmate argued that while he was 'at LARC, the average stay
for inmates equalled thirty-one days. For this reason, the facility
needed an exemption policy for Native American inmates and others
whose religious beliefs conflicted with the regulation.
The district court dismissed the inmate's complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.215 The prisoner
appealed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision. 2 6 The court held the difference in average stay be-
tween ten and thirty-one days was legally insignificant to require the
implementation of an exemption policy.27
E. Mosier v. Maynard
Mosier v. Maynardz58 is another recent Tenth Circuit decision in-
volving a Native American inmate. In Mosier, the prison exempted
the inmate, a one-quarter degree Cherokee, from hair length regula-
tions under an earlier policy. The previous policy focused on whether
the prisoner was Indian, but the new policy focused on whether the
prisoner practiced his beliefs. The inmate applied for an exemption
under the new policy, arguing the importance of his hair to his religion.
The principal chief of the Cherokee Nation articulated the significance
of hair in the Cherokee faith by explaining that the body is an extension
of the Great Spirit, and thus, hair is an integral part of the body.
When the hair is cut, the person's soul is severed from the Creator. 2 9
251. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
252. Id. at 455.
253. Escalanti, No. 89-16598, 1991 WL 83900, at *2.
254. 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991).
255. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 12(b)(6).
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The prison chaplain recommended that the prison deny the exemp-
tion for the inmate because, even though the inmate's beliefs may
have been true, there was no evidence that he practiced these beliefs.
The officials agreed and denied the prisoner's request. The prisoner
appealed the decision to the warden unsuccessfully. The inmate next
sought relief from the district court, which granted summary judgment
in favor of the officials.m° The court explained why the Cherokee
inmate failed to fall within the exemption. 261 First, the inmate had not
supplied prison officials with names, addresses, and telephone numbers
of reputable, nonfamily members who could vouch for his sincerity,
as required by the exemption policy.2 2 Second, the court accepted the
officials' argument that the regulation promoted pride and discipline
while ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of the inmates. 263 The
regulation was, therefore, a valid means by which to accomplish such
objectives.
26
In a somewhat surprising opinion, the Tenth Circuit saw the fallacy
in the district court's reasoning. The officials had provided no evidence
at the lower court level justifying the regulation. 265 Additionally, the
inmate's sincerity in his beliefs was still a material fact at issue.3
Thus, until the sincerity issue was resolved, the court could make no
determination on the exemption argument.2 7 The court subsequently
reversed the judgment for the prison officials.26s
In September 1991, officials removed the exemption procedure from
prison regulations, thus requiring all inmates to comply with hair
length provisions. Mosier sought injunctive relief at the trial court
level but was unsuccessful due to the new "no exemption" policy.
Mosier appealed the decision and requested interlocutory relief against
the cutting of his hair until challenges to the grooming regulations
were heard.69 Meanwhile, the Department of Corrections reinstated
an exemption policy in January 1992. According to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, Mosier satisfied all but one requirement necessary
to a grant of injunctive relief - the substantial likelihood that Mosier
would eventually prevail on the merits. 270 Mosier had shown that
without the injunction, irreparable harm would occur, and the injury
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to Mosier would outweigh any damage the penal institution would
endure.27' Likewise, if injunctive relief was granted, the public's interest
would not be offended. 272 The Court, therefore, relaxed the "substan-
tial likelihood of success" standard.273 The prison regulation potentially
had a negative impact on Mosier's religious freedom; therefore, serious
and substantial questions arose requiring a more deliberate inquiry
into the matter.274 Thus, a preliminary injunction was granted pending
the outcome of Mosier's litigation. 275
F. Kemp v. Moore
Recently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with
Kemp v. Moore,276 a case brought by a Chickasaw inmate housed at
Farmington, Missouri. Citing Iron Eyes as controlling precedent, the
district court granted summary judgment against the inmate who was
requesting injunctive protection from the prison's hair regulation. 277
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding. 278 Judge
Heaney, the author of Teterud and the lone dissenter in Iron Eyes,
concurred in the judgment only because of the precedent set by Iron
Eyes.279 Judge Heaney explained that Kemp was allowed to grow his
hair at a more secure Missouri penitentiary. 20 However, when trans-
ferred, the prison forced Kemp to conform to Farmington's regulation.
Still in disagreement with the Iron Eyes opinion, Judge Heaney stated,
"This case smacks of harassment and religious persecution.
28 1
Conclusion
The four opinions since Iron Eyes involve summary judgments or
dismissals against the Native American prisoners at some point in each
case's procedural history. The effects of Iron Eyes are obvious. Few
courts, if any, look past the prison officials' briefs or answers for
evidence supporting justification. The religious importance of hair to
Native American inmates is 'irrelevant now, as it has been since the
early 1980s. These prisoners, members of a misunderstood culture, will
continue to be denied the right to exercise their religion as long as
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The majority's opinion in Iron Eyes exemplifies the continued Native
American struggle with the institutions of justice in this country. It
not only signifies the plight of Indian prisoners wishing to practice
their religion, but it also signifies the conflicts faced by Native Amer-
icans in the general population who seek to assert their right to religious
freedom. Iron Eyes separates the interrelated factors of prison regu-
lation analysis. The case distorts and twists the significance of some
facts, and ignores the indispensability of others. The opinion dismisses
blatant persecution by prison officials with scarcely articulated disap-
proval, and ultimately authorizes brutality. Iron Eyes' body and faith
were violated in a cruel manner on the basis of unsubstantiated jus-
tifications by prison officials, and the availability of an exemption not
in existence. Iron Eyes is not a change from the past, but merely a
revisit to government-sanctioned scalping of Native Americans.
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